Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 54

Number 3

Article 5

Spring 5-1-2021

Too Many Remedies or Not Enough: Balancing Wage Theft and
Other Public Policy Concerns in Voris v. Lampert
Tina Kuang

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tina Kuang, Comment, Too Many Remedies or Not Enough: Balancing Wage Theft and Other Public Policy
Concerns in Voris v. Lampert, 54 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 881 (2021).

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

(10) 54.3_KUANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/13/21 4:19 PM

TOO MANY REMEDIES OR NOT ENOUGH:
BALANCING WAGE THEFT AND OTHER PUBLIC
POLICY CONCERNS IN VORIS V. LAMPERT
Tina Kuang*
I. INTRODUCTION
The term “wage theft” refers to an employer’s failure to pay its
employees their earned wages.1 It includes a variety of different pay
violations—including paying employees less than minimum wage,
failing to pay overtime, making improper deductions, and refusing to
pay employees altogether.2 Despite strong protections in the Labor
Code, wage theft is a widespread problem in California.3 Even with
regulations in place, “the probability of being caught for wage theft is
so low that it makes economic sense for employers to commit wage
theft on a massive scale.”4 A 2013 report from the National
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., English, University
of Oregon, 2018. Thank you to Professor Bryan Hull for his invaluable feedback and guidance,
Alex Hider for being my sounding board and second pair of eyes, and my mom for her endless love
and support.
1. Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., Hollow Victories: The Crisis in Collecting Unpaid Wages for
California’s Workers, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, 4 (2013), https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/HollowVictories.pdf. See generally KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN
AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT 7 (2009) (Bobo’s book popularized the term “wage theft,” which she defined as
“when an employer violates the law and deprives a worker of legally mandated wages”).
2. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 4; see Eli Wolfe, ‘We’re Being Robbed’: Wage Theft in
California Often Goes Unpunished by State, KQED (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/
11780059/were-being-robbed-california-employers-who-cheat-workers-often-not-heldaccountable-by-state.
3. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 4; Wolfe, supra note 2.
4. Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 97 (2018); id.
at 103 (“Economists have long sought to explain non-compliance with wage and hour laws as a
rational profit-maximizing decision employers make in response to low enforcement rates and weak
penalties. In their seminal 1979 article, Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law, Orley
Ashenfelter and Robert Smith theorized that an employer’s decision to pay less than the minimum
wage involves a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the probability of detection, the
expected penalties that would occur if detected, and the profit the employer expects to make by
violating the law.” (citing Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum
Wage Law, 87 J. POL. ECON. 333, 335–36 (1979))); see, e.g., Kate Taylor, McDonald’s Is Paying
Out $26 Million to Thousands of Workers After Settling a Wage-Theft Lawsuit, with Employees
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Employment Law Project (“NELP Report”)5 estimates that “654,914
workers in Los Angeles face one pay-related violation” in any given
week.6 In fact, “[w]age theft is a far bigger problem than bank
robberies, convenience store robberies, street and highway robberies,
and gas station robberies combined.”7 Yet, despite its prevalence,
wage theft receives very little national political attention; “[i]t is a
crisis unfolding largely outside of public view.”8
The two main ways employees recover stolen wages in California
are by (1) pursuing a claim with the California Labor Commissioner
(also called the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement); or (2)
filing a lawsuit.9 However, even when employees successfully pursue
their wage claims, winning a judgment is often just a “hollow
victory.”10 Many employers who are found liable for wage violations
have no intention to pay their employees the stolen wages, going so
far as to abandon, transfer, or sell their businesses—sometimes even
before the judgment is delivered.11 By doing so, employers no longer
have to worry about their assets being seized to satisfy the judgment.12
Although pay violations, and the subsequent difficulty collecting
stolen wages, are “shockingly high” in low-wage industries,13 another

Getting Checks for as Much as $3,900 in Lost Wages, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2020, 2:45 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/mcdonalds-to-pay-26-million-after-settling-wage-theft-lawsuit2020-10 (“Roughly 34,000 McDonald’s employees at corporate-owned locations across California
will receive checks as part of [a $26 million settlement to a wage theft lawsuit]. Workers will
receive checks for an average of $333.52, with some receiving as much as $3,927.91 . . . .”).
5. The NELP Report is based on a comprehensive review of records released by the Labor
Commissioner between 2008 and 2011. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 1.
6. Id. at 4; see CAL. LAB. COMM’R’S OFF., 2017–2018 FISCAL YEAR REPORT ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUREAU OF FIELD ENFORCEMENT 2 (2018), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse
/BOFE_LegReport2018.pdf (“The US Department of Labor reported in 2014 that the minimum
wage law is violated in California 372,000 times per week and that more than one in 10 workers in
California is paid less than the minimum wage. An often-cited 2010 study by the UCLA Labor
Center found that frontline workers in Los Angeles County lose $26.2 million per week in stolen
wages.”).
7. Ross Eisenbrey, Wage Theft Is a Bigger Problem than Other Theft—But Not Enough Is
Done to Protect Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.epi.org/publication/wa
ge-theft-bigger-problem-theft-protect/.
8. Hallett, supra note 4, at 102.
9. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 7.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id. at 14; Wolfe, supra note 2.
12. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 14, 17.
13. Id. at 4.
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industry faces the same problem: startups.14 The opportunity to create
the next big thing has “long lured ambitious entrepreneurs into shiny
co-working spaces and startup accelerators” in Silicon Valley, but the
reality is that most startups fail.15 These failures can be crushing for
all those involved.16 Not only does the death of a startup mean the loss
of a job and the death of a dream, it also means a lack of funds to
compensate employees for work they have already put in.17 Although
the practice of withholding wages is illegal, it is a rather common
problem when startup founders “put off paying employees as they wait
out their next round of funding.”18 If the funding falls through, there
is often no money left to pay employees the wages they have already
earned.19
That is what happened to plaintiff Brett Voris (“Voris”) in Voris
v. Lampert.20 Voris helped defendant Greg Lampert (“Lampert”)
launch three startup ventures with the promise of receiving payment
of wages and stock at a later date.21 Voris was eventually fired from
all three companies and never received those wages, so he sued his
former employers.22 Voris prevailed against all three companies, but
he was unable to collect on the judgments because the startups lacked
funds and assets.23 Thereafter, Voris focused his efforts on Lampert
and sought to hold him personally responsible for the unpaid wages
under the theory of common law conversion.24
In a five to two decision, the California Supreme Court held there
could be no tort conversion claim based on the nonpayment of
wages.25 In doing so, the majority opinion distinguished the
conversion of unpaid wages from other cases involving the conversion
of money, opining that (1) employees do not have a property interest
in their unpaid wages; and (2) unpaid wages do not involve “a specific
14. Marisa Kendall, When Startups Fail: What Happens When the Cash Runs Out, MERCURY
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016, 8:41 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/10/02/when-startups-failwhat-happens-when-the-cash-runs-out/.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 446 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2019).
21. Id. at 286.
22. Id. at 286–87.
23. Id. at 287.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 286, 299.
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sum capable of identification,” a requirement for the conversion of
money.26 However, the dissenting opinion found precedent to be
indistinguishable and reached the opposite conclusion: that (1)
employees do have a property interest in their unpaid wages; and (2)
unpaid wages can, and do, involve a “specific sum capable of
identification.”27
Based on the majority and the dissent’s conflicting interpretations
of the same cases, this Comment argues that both opinions were driven
by public policy concerns instead of the sound application of
precedent. Part II presents the facts and procedural history of the case,
and Part III explores the majority and dissent’s reasoning as to why a
conversion claim is or is not the appropriate remedy to address wage
theft. In Part IV, Sections IV.A and IV.B contend that both opinions
are rooted in public policy concerns because the distinction between
this case and precedent seems rather arbitrary. Section IV.C observes
that while Voris can recover under the existing remedies, not all
victims of wage theft can recover their stolen wages without
maintaining a conversion claim. Finally, Section IV.D argues that
conversion based on the nonpayment of wages should not be
categorically barred and offers two elements to limit the scope of a
conversion claim for unpaid wages that address the majority’s policy
concerns described in Section IV.B.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Voris Prevails in His Lawsuits Against All Three Companies
In November 2005, Voris joined Lampert and Ryan Bristol
(“Bristol”) to launch a real estate investment company, Premier Ten
Thirty One Capital (“PropPoint”).28 Voris provided both marketing
and advertising services to PropPoint.29 Lampert and Bristol later
recruited Voris to do similar work for two other startup ventures,
Liquiddium Capital Partners, LLC (“Liquiddium”) and Sportfolio,
Inc. (“Sportfolio”).30 In exchange for his work at all three companies,
Lampert and Bristol promised Voris later payment of wages, stock, or

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 290–94.
See id. at 300–03 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
Id. at 286 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
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both.31 In exchange for additional equity, Voris also invested money
in PropPoint and Liquiddium.32
In fall 2006, Voris discovered alleged financial improprieties by
Lampert and Bristol.33 When Voris voiced his concerns, Bristol and
Lampert criticized his work performance and accused him of stealing
company money.34 Voris was eventually terminated from all three
companies.35 The startups never paid Voris the wages or stock they
owed him, except for a portion of compensation from PropPoint
during his employment.36
Voris sued the three companies, Lampert, and Bristol.37 He
alleged twenty-four causes of action in the operative complaint,
“including breach of oral contract, quantum meruit, fraud, failure to
pay wages in violation of the Labor Code, conversion, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith, and breach of fiduciary duty.”38 The
relief sought by Voris included “$91,000 in unpaid wages from
PropPoint, $66,000 from Sportfolio, and various percentages of equity
in all three companies.”39 In addition, he “sought to hold both Lampert
and Bristol personally liable on all counts based on [the] theory of alter
ego liability.”40
“[O]n the claims against Sportfolio for breach of contract, failure
to pay wages, failure to pay for services rendered, and conversion of
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Voris v. Lampert, No. B265747, 2017 WL 1153334, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017),
aff’d, 446 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2019).
35. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 286.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 287.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Alter ego liability allows for the injured party to hold shareholders personally
responsible for the debts or actions of a corporation but requires the plaintiff to “pierce the corporate
veil.” Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Ct., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836 (Ct. App. 2000)
(“Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its stockholders,
officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations. A corporate identity
may be disregarded—the ‘corporate veil’ pierced—where an abuse of the corporate privilege
justifies holding the equitable ownership of a corporation liable for the actions of the corporation.
Under the alter ego doctrine, then, when the corporate form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent
a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, the courts will ignore the
corporate entity and deem the corporation’s acts to be those of the persons or organizations actually
controlling the corporation, in most instances the equitable owners. The alter ego doctrine prevents
individuals or other corporations from misusing the corporate laws by the device of a sham
corporate entity formed for the purpose of committing fraud or other misdeeds.” (citations
omitted)).
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stock,” the jury found in Voris’s favor and awarded him $70,782 in
damages.41 On the claims against Liquiddium for breach of contract
and conversion of stock, the jury also found for Voris and awarded
him $100,218.42 This amount included “$2,500 in punitive damages
on the stock conversion claim.”43 In a bench trial against PropPoint,
who did not enter an appearance, “the court ruled in Voris’s favor on
the claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, failure to pay wages
in violation of the Labor Code, and conversion of stock and wages”
and “awarded Voris $171,951 in damages, plus prejudgment interest,
costs, and attorney fees.”44
B. Unable to Collect on the Judgments Because the Companies
Lacked Funds and Assets, Voris Focuses on His Action Against
Lampert
Despite prevailing against all three companies, Voris was unable
to collect on the judgments.45 PropPoint, Liquiddium, and Sportfolio
all lacked funds and assets, so instead, Voris turned his efforts toward
Lampert, who “allegedly ran down the companies’ accounts and
mismanaged the startups into insolvency.”46
At the start of litigation, Lampert “successfully demurred to the
claims of fraud and breach of the implied covenant of good faith.”47
The trial court then granted Lampert’s motion for summary judgment
on the remaining claims because Voris failed to adequately support his
alter ego liability allegations.48 The court noted that “[i]n an
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed in part and
reversed in part”; it upheld the ruling that Voris’s claims of alter ego
liability were insufficient because he failed to “identify supporting
facts,” but reversed with respect to the conversion claims because
“individual officers may be held personally liable for their intentional
torts ‘without any need to pierce the corporate veil.’”49

41. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 287.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; id. at 299 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 287 (majority opinion).
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Voris v. Lampert, No. B234116, 2014 WL 2119993, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May
22, 2014).
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On remand before the trial court, Lampert moved for judgment
on the pleadings on the stock and wage conversion claims, “argu[ing]
that Voris failed to allege a sufficient deprivation of ownership interest
in the stocks and that California law does not recognize a claim for the
conversion of wages.”50 The trial court granted the motions, and again,
the court of appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part.51
In a second unpublished decision, all three justices agreed that the
“stock conversion claims should be permitted to proceed,” relying on
a “uniform rule of law that shares of stock in a company are subject to
an action in conversion.”52 However, “the justices were divided on
whether Voris had pleaded a cognizable claim” for wage conversion.53
The majority concluded that a conversion tort claim based on the
nonpayment of wages was not warranted by existing case law or policy
considerations; “the Labor Code already requires prompt payment of
a discharged employee and authorizes penalties for noncompliance.”54
The majority worried that if Voris’s claim were allowed to continue,
“any claimed wage and hour violation would give rise to tort liability
for conversion as well as the potential for punitive damages.”55 In
contrast, the concurring and dissenting justice “opined that
‘employees have a vested property interest in their earned wages, that
failure to pay them is a legal wrong that interferes with this property
interest, and that an action for conversion may therefore be brought to
recover unpaid wages.’”56
The California Supreme Court granted de novo review to address
the disagreement.57
III. REASONING OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
The sole issue before the court was whether a terminated
employee could bring an action against his employer’s part-owner to
hold the part-owner personally responsible for improperly
withholding the employee’s wages under the common law theory of
50. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 287.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also Voris v. Lampert, No. B265747, 2017 WL 1153334, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 28, 2017), aff’d, 446 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2019).
53. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 287.
54. Id. at 288 (citation omitted); see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 201, 203 (West, Westlaw through
Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
55. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 288.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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conversion.58 Justice Kruger wrote the majority opinion, which
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal; Chief Justice CantilSakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, and Groban concurred.59 Justice
Cuéllar wrote the dissenting opinion, and Justice Liu concurred.60
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion held that “[t]he conversion tort is not the
right fit for the wrong that Voris alleges, nor is it the right fix for the
deficiencies Voris perceives in the existing system of remedies for
wage nonpayment.”61 It found that precedent did not support allowing
a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages.62 Further, because
extensive remedies already existed to combat wage theft in California,
the majority opinion did not want to “duplicate [those] remedies” with
conversion.63
1. The Existing Remedial Scheme
The majority began its analysis with an “overview of existing law
governing the payment of [employee] wages.”64 First, the majority
emphasized that the employment relationship is “‘fundamentally
contractual,’ meaning it is governed in the first instance by the mutual
promises made between employer and employee.”65 An action for
breach of contract is the “usual remedy” for when a promise is
broken.66 Accordingly, an action for breach of contract is also the
“usual remedy” for when an employer breaches the promise to pay its
employee for services rendered.67 Even if there is no “explicit promise
for payment, the law will imply one” and authorize recovery if it is
clear the parties “understood the employee was not volunteering
[their] services free of charge.”68

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
1975)).
67.
68.

See id. at 286.
Id. at 286, 299.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 290–94.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 288.
Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1988)).
Id. (quoting Glendale City Emps.’ Ass’n v. City of Glendale, 540 P.2d 609, 619 (Cal.
Id.
Id.
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To supplement those contract remedies with additional worker
protections, the Legislature enacted several statutory remedies “to
ensure employees receive prompt and full compensation for their
labor.”69 That resulted in “a mass of legislation touching upon almost
every aspect of the employer-employee relationship.”70
The majority noted that Voris relied on these existing contract and
statutory remedies to obtain judgments against PropPoint,
Liquiddium, and Sportfolio.71 However, Voris was ultimately unable
to collect on the judgments because Lampert deliberately managed the
startups into insolvency.72 Therefore, he wanted the court to
supplement existing remedies “with a common law cause of action for
conversion of unpaid wages.”73 And despite the fact that the obligation
to pay those wages belonged to his employers (the three startups),
Voris also wanted the court to recognize a claim against “individual
officers who have either directed or participated in the employer’s
failure to pay.”74 Specifically, Voris wanted to hold Lampert
personally liable under tort law for withholding his earned wages.75
The majority, and Voris, acknowledged that no precedential California
decision has recognized a conversion claim based on the nonpayment
of wages before.76
2. Applying Precedent
Next, the majority addressed precedent, beginning with an
overview of the conversion tort.77 Conversion is “the wrongful
exercise of dominion over personal property of another.”78 The
elements are: “(a) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of
personal property, (b) defendant’s disposition of property in a manner
inconsistent with plaintiff’s property rights, and (c) resulting
damages.”79 The majority noted that “absent from this formula is any

69. Id. at 289.
70. Id. (quoting Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 289–90.
78. Id. at 290 (quoting 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW: TORTS § 810 (11th
ed. 2017)).
79. Id. (quoting 5 B.E. WITKIN, 5 B.E. WITKIN, supra note 78, § 810).
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element of wrongful intent or motive; in California, conversion is a
‘strict liability tort.’”80 Furthermore, “[p]unitive damages are
recoverable upon a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression.”81 In
appropriate circumstances, emotional distress damages are also
recoverable.82
With that foundation laid out, the majority applied conversion to
the nonpayment of wages.83 Although it was once contested,
“California law now holds that property subject to a conversion claim
need not be tangible in form,” and money can be the subject of a
conversion claim if “a specific sum capable of identification is
involved.”84 However—as explored in Section IV.A—the majority
differentiated between Voris’s case and other cases involving the
conversion of money, holding that (1) employees do not have a
property interest in their unpaid wages; and (2) unpaid wages do not
involve “a specific sum capable of identification.”85
3. Rejecting Conversion as Another Remedy
Along with opining that a conversion claim for unpaid wages is
unsupported by precedent, the majority declined to expand the scope
of conversion because there are already “extensive remedies” to
address the issue:
An employee seeking recovery of a contractual right to
payment of wages is, of course, entitled to sue for breach of
contract or, absent a written agreement, for quantum meruit.
But that is far from all. The Legislature has repeatedly acted
to supplement these common law remedies with statutory
remedies.86
The majority noted that presently, the Labor Code is the greatest
defense against the nonpayment of wages and “secures an employee’s
right to the full and prompt payment of final wages,” regardless of
whether the employee is terminated or voluntarily quits.87 Under the
Labor Code, employers who willfully fail to comply with its
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. (quoting Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 290–94.
Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 290–94; see infra Section IV.A.
Lampert, 446 P.3d at 294–95.
Id. at 295.
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requirements are subject to civil penalties.88 The Labor Commissioner
can require an employer who fails to satisfy a wage judgment or is
convicted of violating wage laws “to post a bond with the state in order
to continue doing business in California.”89 If the Labor
Commissioner fails to “take action despite repeat violations by an
employer, private individuals can seek a temporary restraining order
to halt the employer’s business without waiting for the Commissioner
to enjoin it first.”90 Further, the willful failure to pay wages and the
denial of valid wage claims are criminal offenses, punishable as
misdemeanors under the Labor Code.91
The majority believed the “Labor Code provisions illustrate[how]
the Legislature can craft rights and remedies that target those
employers and individual officers who withhold wages willfully and
repeatedly, and who strategically evade wage judgments.”92 In fact,
after Voris filed suit, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 588
(“Senate Bill 588”) in 2015 to address the exact problem that Voris
alleged: “‘Irresponsible employers [that] may have hidden their cash
assets, declared bankruptcy, or otherwise become judgment-proof’ to
avoid adverse wage judgments.”93
Senate Bill 588 “enact[ed] special provisions for the enforcement
of judgments against an employer arising from the employer’s
nonpayment of wages for work performed in [California]” and
empowered the Labor Commissioner to use “existing remedies
available to a judgment creditor and to act as a levying officer when
enforcing a judgment pursuant to a writ of execution.”94 Most
importantly, Senate Bill 588 added section 558.1 to the Labor Code,
which allows “[a]ny employer or other person acting on behalf of an
employer” to be held liable as the employer for their willful conduct
relating to wage nonpayment.95 Voris’s goal was to directly reach
“individual officers who are responsible for their companies’ evasion
88. Id.
89. Id. at 297 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 240 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg.
Sess.)).
90. Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 243).
91. Id. at 295 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 216).
92. Id. at 297.
93. Id. (alteration in original).
94. S.B. 588, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96.8, 98,
238, 238.1, 238.2, 238.3, 238.4, 238.5, 558.1 (Senate Bill 588 amended Labor Code section 98 and
added Labor Code sections 96.8, 238, 238.1, 238.2, 238.3, 238.4, 238.5, and 558.1).
95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 588.1.

(10) 54.3_KUANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

892

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/13/21 4:19 PM

[Vol. 54:881

of their established wage obligations”—i.e., Lampert.96 Under Labor
Code section 558.1, he could do so without alleging Lampert
converted his unpaid wages. 97 Therefore, the majority believed “a
conversion claim for unpaid wages would largely duplicate [existing]
remedies” and “serve little purpose.”98
The majority noted that while the legislative solutions may not be
perfect, the history of wage-payment regulation in California shows
that the Legislature has been attentive to the problem of wage theft
and is working to provide “appropriately tailored relief.”99 A
conversion claim for unpaid wages is just not the appropriate relief; it
would “transform a category of contract claims into torts”100 and “pile
additional measures of tort damages on top of statutory recovery, even
in cases of good-faith mistake.”101 Because of extensive remedies that
already exist to combat wage theft in California, the majority declined
to also allow a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages.102
Nevertheless, the majority agreed that “[t]he full and prompt
payment of wages is of fundamental importance to the welfare of both
workers and the State of California.”103
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, believed that “[t]he
doctrinal basis for invoking conversion here is as solid as California’s
longstanding concern about wage theft.”104 It criticized the majority
for “acknowledg[ing] but then sidestep[ping]” the fact that “numerous
plaintiffs have successfully sought compensation for their labor
through the tort of conversion.”105 The dissent addressed the same
precedent involving the conversion of money that the majority did, but
it reached the opposite conclusion: that (1) employees do have a
property interest in their unpaid wages; and (2) unpaid wages can, and
96. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296.
97. CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1; see Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296–98.
98. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 295.
99. Id. at 298.
100. Cf. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87–99 (1974) (asserting that contract
law is not as neat and tidy as it appears in casebooks because those cases are selected and reported
to fit preexisting categories of contract law).
101. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 298–99.
102. Id. at 299.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 300 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 299.
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do, involve a “specific sum capable of identification.”106 Section IV.A
contrasts the difference between the majority and the dissent’s
treatment of those same cases.107 While “[t]he majority [found] it
‘notable’ that no precedential California decision has yet recognized a
conversion claim based on withholding of wages,” the dissent found
it more conspicuous that there is no precedential decision refusing to
recognize such a claim.108
The dissent disagreed with the majority that conversion was not
“the right fit for the wrong,” nor “an appropriate remedy,” because
regardless of how or why the wage theft happened, the financial hit to
the worker’s income is a heavy burden, and the worker should be able
to recover their stolen wages.109 “Despite ‘the considerable body of
statutory law that is specifically designed to directly punish and deter
employers that fail to satisfy wage judgments,’” the remedies in
existence at the time Voris filed suit were indisputably inadequate.110
Therefore, the dissent believed the tort of conversion should be
available to employees “as a complement to the legislative scheme,”
which is “consistent with the tort’s broad scope under California law
and with the manner in which state legislative remedies and the
common law traditionally interact.”111 A conversion claim for the
nonpayment of wages would supplement existing legislative remedies
“to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their . . .
rights.”112
IV. ANALYSIS
While the majority did not want to duplicate existing remedies,
the dissent wanted to provide employees with additional remedies to
combat wage theft.113 Nevertheless, both the majority and the
dissenting opinions were driven by public policy concerns instead of

106. See id. at 300–02.
107. See infra Section IV.A.
108. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 302 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 303.
110. Id. at 302.
111. Id. at 304.
112. Id. (omission in original) (citing Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 378 (Cal. 1990)).
113. Compare id. at 295 (majority opinion) (“[A] conversion claim for unpaid wages would
largely duplicate these remedies and, to that extent, would serve little purpose.”), with id. at 304
(Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (arguing that the tort claim of conversion should complement the existing
legislative scheme).
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the sound application of precedent.114 Despite addressing the very
same cases, the majority and the dissent reached opposite conclusions
on whether (1) employees had a property interest in their unpaid
wages; and (2) unpaid wages involved a “specific sum capable of
identification.”115 As a result, the distinction between this case and
other cases involving the conversion of money seems rather arbitrary.
Instead, other factors influenced the majority and the dissent. While
the dissent was focused on combatting wage theft, the majority’s
primary concern was that a conversion claim for unpaid wages would
essentially duplicate existing remedies while “blurring the common
law distinction between contract and tort” law and bringing forth
undesirable features, like strict liability and punitive damages.116
With the enactment of Senate Bill 588, the majority is correct that
Voris would be able to hold Lampert personally liable for his stolen
wages without relying on the conversion tort.117 However, the
majority failed to consider situations beyond this case where the
ability to maintain a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages
may be crucial for an employee to recover their stolen wages.118 To
help all victims of wage theft, not just Voris, a conversion cause of
action should be available to recover unpaid wages when (1) the court
can ascertain the specific sum of money that is owed; and (2) the
employee can show by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant (the employer, employer’s officers, or a third party) acted
with malice, oppression, or fraud in withholding the employee’s
wages.119
A. The Majority and the Dissent Reached Opposite Conclusions
Despite Applying the Same Precedent
1. Precedent Involving the Conversion of Money
Although the majority held that employees cannot bring a
conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages, precedent establishes
that money can be the subject of a conversion claim if a “specific sum
114. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
115. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 290–94 (majority opinion); id. at 299–302 (Cuéllar, J.,
dissenting).
116. Id. at 300; see infra Section IV.B.
117. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 297–98 (majority opinion); S.B. 588, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2015); infra Section IV.C.1.
118. See infra Section IV.C.2.
119. See infra Section IV.D.
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capable of identification is involved.”120 For example, “a real estate
agent may be liable for conversion where he had accepted
commissions on behalf of himself and a business partner, but refused
to give the partner his share”;121 “a sales agent may be liable for the
conversion of proceeds from a consignment sale where the agent did
not remit any portion of the proceeds to the principal seller”;122 and “a
client may be liable to an attorney for conversion of attorney fees
received as part of a settlement, where a lien established the attorney’s
ownership of the fees in question.”123 To support his argument that
conversion should be allowed to recover unpaid wages, Voris also
cited two California cases that involved the conversion of earned
wages: Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc.124 and Department of
Industrial Relations v. UI Video Stores, Inc.125
Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. held that while Labor Code
section 351 does not provide a private right of action for an employee
to recover gratuities withheld by the employer, a common law claim
such as conversion could potentially be brought against an employer
who misappropriates gratuities left for its employees.126 The majority
in Voris v. Lampert agreed that conversion was appropriate in that
instance because “[w]hen a patron leaves a gratuity for an employee
(or employees), it arguably qualifies as a specific sum of money,
belonging to the employee, that is capable of identification.”127
In UI Video Stores, the court approved a conversion claim
brought by the Labor Commissioner on behalf of Blockbuster
employees to recover money unlawfully deducted from their
paychecks to pay for uniforms.128 After the parties settled, Blockbuster
mailed individual checks to the employees in the amount of the
wrongful deductions.129 When a number of checks were returned as
“undeliverable,” the Labor Commissioner told Blockbuster to deposit

120. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 291 (citing Haigler v. Donnelly, 117 P.2d 331, 335 (Cal. 1941)).
121. Id. (citing Sanowicz v. Bacal, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 529 (Ct. App. 2015)).
122. Id. (citing Fischer v. Machado, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 215–16 (Ct. App. 1996)).
123. Id. at 291–92 (citing Weiss v. Marcus, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (Ct. App. 1975)).
124. 236 P.3d 346 (Cal. 2010).
125. 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Ct. App. 1997); see also Lampert, 446 P.3d at 293–94.
126. Lu, 236 P.3d at 353 (noting that other remedies, such as common law conversion, may be
available; however, the court never actually decided the issue).
127. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 293.
128. UI Video Stores, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
129. Id.
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those checks in California’s unpaid wages fund.130 Blockbuster
refused, and the Labor Commissioner filed a second complaint,
alleging that the refusal was an unlawful conversion of the checks for
Blockbuster’s own use.131 The court of appeal reversed summary
judgment in Blockbuster’s favor, accepting the Labor Commissioner’s
contention that it had the right to immediate possession of the checks
as the agent of the state and trustee for the employees.132 The majority
in Voris v. Lampert noted that “[a]lthough UI Video Stores involved a
conversion action related to wrongfully withheld wages, it did not
concern a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages.”133 The
majority also stated that at the time of the action in UI Video Stores
the checks themselves were “arguably” the property of the employees
because Blockbuster had already cut and mailed the checks to the
employees.134
The claim for conversion of checks addressed in UI Video Stores
is also authorized by statute: California Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) section 3420 states that “[t]he law applicable to conversion of
personal property applies to instruments,” including checks.135 The
UCC also authorizes claims for the conversion of money in other
circumstances. UCC section 9315, subdivision (a)(1) contains the
general rule that a security interest survives disposition of the
collateral, and a person who sells property that is subject to a security
interest may be liable to the secured party for conversion.136 Often, a
plaintiff suing under UCC section 3420 or section 9315, subdivision

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 463–64 (“[T]he [Labor Commissioner] need not possess legal title to the property at
issue to support a cause of action for conversion. A person without legal title to property may
recover from a converter if the plaintiff is responsible to the true owner, such as in the case of a
bailee or pledgee of the property.”).
133. Voris v. Lampert, 446 P.3d 284, 294 (Cal. 2019) (emphasis added and omitted).
134. Id.
135. CAL. COM. CODE § 3420 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). However,
“[t]here can be no conversion action until the check is delivered to the payee because until delivery,
the payee is not a holder and has no property interest in the check.” Software Design & Application,
Ltd. v. Hoefer & Arnett, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 764–65 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing CAL. COM.
CODE § 3420(a)); cf. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 709 (Cal. 2000)
(“Once earned, . . . unpaid wages became property to which the employees were entitled.”).
136. CAL. COM. CODE § 9315(a)(1), cmt. 2 (“[A] secured party may repossess the collateral
from the transferee or, in an appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion.”).
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(a)(1) is seeking money, not the check or the collateral itself.137 Thus,
in both instances, the plaintiff is essentially bringing a conversion
claim for money under the applicable statute.
2. The Majority’s Application of Precedent
But despite case law and statutory law allowing conversion
claims for money, the majority held that Voris could not bring a
conversion claim for unpaid wages because unpaid wages (1) do not
involve “a specific sum capable of identification is involved”; and (2)
are not inherently the property of the employee.138 In the majority’s
view, past cases that allowed for conversion based on money and
compensation differ because “specific sums” were involved, and
unpaid wages do not involve a “specific sum.”139 Thus, employees do
not have a property interest in their unpaid wages.140
According to the majority, an employee’s claim to unpaid wages
differs from other claims involving the conversion of money because
the “employee’s claim is not that the employer has wrongfully
exercised dominion over a specifically identifiable pot of money that
already belongs to the employee.”141 Instead, the employee is claiming
the employer, or the employer’s officer, “failed to reach into its own
funds to satisfy [the] debt.”142 The majority noted that in some cases
of wage nonpayment, the money that the employee would have been
paid out of may have never existed in the first place, giving an all-toofamiliar example:
[A] failed start-up that generates no income and thus finds
itself unable to pay its employees. Because the business
accounts are empty, there would not be any identifiable
monies for the employer to convert. No one would dispute
that the start-up is indebted to its employees. But only in the
realm of fiction could a court conclude that the business, by

137. Id. (“In many cases, a purchaser or other transferee of collateral will take free of a security
interest, and the secured party’s only right will be to proceeds.”). But in some cases, a secured party
might actually seek non-cash collateral for the purpose of foreclosing on it. Id.
138. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 290–94.
139. See id. at 291–92.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 292.
142. Id.
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failing to earn the money needed to pay wages, has somehow
converted that nonexistent money to its own use.143
What distinguishes the conversion of unpaid wages from other
cases involving the conversion of money is the fact that the money
“may never have existed in the first place.”144
The majority also rejected the argument that unpaid wages are the
property of the employee, and therefore, the nonpayment of wages
should simply be treated as conversion of property.145 To support this
contention, Voris relied on language found in Cortez v. Purolator Air
Filtration Products Co.,146 which stated that “earned wages that are
due and payable pursuant to section 200 et seq. of the Labor Code
are . . . the property of the employee who has given his or her labor to
the employer in exchange for that property.”147 Despite the fact that
the court in Cortez explicitly says earned wages are the property of the
employee, the majority held that the language “concerned the
availability of a restitutionary remedy under the Unfair Competition
Law (UCL)” and only applied in that specific context.148 Further, UCL
awards “encompass quantifiable sums one person owes to another”
while there was no identifiable sum in Voris’s case.149
Because unpaid wages are not a “specific sum capable of
identification,” nor the property of the employee, the majority held
that Voris did not have a property interest in the money and could not
maintain a conversion claim for his unpaid wages.150
3. The Dissent’s Application of Precedent
Although the dissent analyzed the same cases as the majority, it
reached the opposite conclusion: that (1) employees do have a
property interest in their unpaid wages; and (2) unpaid wages can, and
do, involve a “specific sum capable of identification.”151 The majority
faulted the dissent for seeing the other cases involving the conversion
of money as “functionally indistinguishable from this one” because

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 292–93.
999 P.2d 706 (Cal. 2000).
Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
Lampert, 446 P.3d at 292.
Id.
See id. at 291–92.
Id. at 300–02 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
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“all of [the] cases involve, at some level, a claim to money earned as
compensation for performing a service.”152 However, even if the past
cases can be distinguished to a certain degree, the dissent highlights
just how arbitrary the distinctions are.
The dissent observed that Voris could properly maintain a
conversion claim to recover his money if Lampert had exercised
dominion over his real estate commissions,153 if Lampert were his
agent and failed to pay him proceeds from the sale of cosigned
goods,154 or if Voris were an attorney seeking to recover fees from a
client’s award.155 The dissent also noted that “Voris successfully
invoked conversion in this case to recover the [part] of his
compensation that consist[ed] of stock.”156 It was only with respect to
his unpaid wages that the majority decided conversion was no longer
the right fit.157
Citing Cortez, the dissent agreed with Voris that unpaid wages
are the employee’s property: “‘[o]nce earned, those unpaid wages
became property to which the employees were entitled.’ Indeed, they
are ‘as much the property of the employee who has given his or her
labor to the employer in exchange for that property as is property a
person surrenders through an unfair business practice.’”158 The latter
type of property could surely be subject to a conversion action.159 The
dissent argued that the exchange of labor for money is what causes
“unpaid wages to become the worker’s property[,] even when those
funds are still [possessed by] the employer[].”160 Refuting the
majority’s argument that the funds may not have existed in the first
place, the dissent urged that even if “the unpaid wages [are]
commingled with the employer’s general funds,” it “does not
disqualify them as property that may be converted, so long as the sum
owed is specific and definite.”161 And to establish the first element of
152. Id. at 292 (majority opinion).
153. Id. at 299 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (citing Sanowicz v. Bacal, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 529
(Ct. App. 2015)).
154. Id. (citing Fischer v. Machado, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 215–16 (Ct. App. 1996)).
155. Id. (citing Weiss v. Marcus, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (Ct. App. 1975)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 300 (citing Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 709, 715
(Cal. 2000)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 301.
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the conversion tort,162 it is enough for a plaintiff “to show [their]
ownership or right to possession of personal property’”; “[n]o
extensive discourse on its nature as ‘property’ is required.”163
An action for unpaid wages is not just an “action[] for a particular
amount of money owed in exchange for contractual performance,” as
the majority would suggest.164 After all, “wages are not ordinary
debts.”165 The court explained that “because of the economic position
of the average worker and, in particular, his dependence on wages for
the necessities of life for himself and his family, it is essential to the
public welfare that he receive his pay when it is due.”166 With that in
mind, the dissent opined that employees have a property interest in
their wages and the right to bring a conversion action to recover
them.167 Although “Voris’s plight does not precisely resemble the kind
of wage theft too often afflicting lower-income workers, Voris has not
been paid what the courts have determined he is owed—and no one
disputes this.”168 In that sense, there is a “specific sum” involved—
$70,782 from the judgment against Sportfolio, $100,218 from
Liquiddium, and $171,951 from PropPoint.169 The dissent also refuted
the majority’s analysis of UI Video Stores, which stated that “the
[Labor Commissioner] could have brought a conversion action for
unpaid wages because it was empowered to collect such sums on
behalf of the affected employees.”170 The dissent did not understand
“why a state agency [could] sue for conversion of unpaid wages on
behalf of the workers who earned those wages, but” the workers
themselves are “barred from asserting that conversion cause of action
directly.”171

162. Id. at 290 (majority opinion) (“As it has developed in California, the tort comprises three
elements: ‘(a) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of personal property, (b) defendant’s
disposition of property in a manner inconsistent with plaintiff’s property rights, and (c) resulting
damages.’” (quoting WITKIN, supra note 78, § 810)).
163. Id. at 301 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (citing WITKIN, supra note 78, § 810).
164. Id. at 300 (alteration in original).
165. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Trombley, 193 P.2d 734, 740 (Cal. 1948)).
166. Id. (quoting In re Trombley, 193 P.2d at 740).
167. Id. at 300–01.
168. Id. at 300.
169. See id. at 287 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 301 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
171. Id.
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In wage cases, plaintiffs “have routinely included a claim for
conversion”172 and other jurisdictions have recognized wage
conversion claims.173 In the dissent’s view, there was no reason to
distinguish this case from other cases involving the conversion of
money, especially when earned wages are the property of the
employee.174
B. Instead of the Sound Application of Precedent, Both Opinions
Were Heavily Influenced by Different Public Policy Concerns
Despite addressing the same cases, the majority and the dissent
reached opposite conclusions.175 Instead, other factors influenced the
opposing opinions more than the sound application of precedent. The
dissent’s clear focus was combatting wage theft by giving workers
access to as many remedies as possible.176 But for the majority, it was
the concern that allowing a conversion claim for unpaid wages would
largely duplicate existing remedies, while opening the door to
undesirable features inherent to the conversion tort.177
1. Wage Theft
Along with the legal analysis, the dissenting opinion expressed
clear concern for workers who have had, or will have, their wages
stolen.178 For example, the dissent noted that:
A recent study estimated that minimum wage violations
alone cost California workers nearly $2 billion per year.

172. Id. at 302; see, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 562 n.3 (Cal. 2007) (conversion
claim for unpaid overtime); Falk v. Child.’s Hosp. L.A., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 688 (Ct. App. 2015)
(claim for “[c]onversion and theft of labor” for failure to timely pay wages); On-Line Power, Inc.
v. Mazur, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 698, 699 (Ct. App. 2007) (conversion claim for unpaid wages); Dunlap
v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 614, 615 (Ct. App. 2006) (claim for “conversion and theft of
labor”).
173. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 302 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting); Sims v. AT&T Mobility Servs.
LLC, 955 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119–20 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]here is clear authority under California
law that employees have a vested property interest in the wages that they earn, failure to pay them
is a legal wrong that interferes with the employee’s title in the wages, and an action for conversion
can therefore be brought to recover unpaid wages.”); see also Lampert, 446 P.3d at 289 n.6
(majority opinion) (majority recognizing that other jurisdictions have allowed a cause of action for
conversion based on unpaid wages).
174. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 301–02 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 290–94 (majority opinion); id. at 300–02 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 304.
177. See id. at 295–96 (majority opinion).
178. See generally id. at 299–304 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (discussing the economic and societal
harm done to workers that have or will have their wages stolen).
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When workers cannot collect wages they are owed, they are
unable to pay for food, housing, or other bills. They spend
less overall, slowing local economies and decreasing tax
revenue for state and local governments. And employers who
fail to pay wages in full and on time create an uneven playing
field in which law-abiding businesses are unable to compete.
What happened to Voris, in effect, leads to a badly distorted
and fundamentally unfair marketplace for both labor and
consumers. Even if Voris’s plight does not precisely
resemble the kind of wage theft too often afflicting lowerincome workers, Voris has not been paid what the courts
have determined he is owed—and no one disputes this.179
Rather than focusing on Voris’s specific situation, the dissent
considered broadly the issue of wage theft in California and all its
potential victims.180 After all, most victims of wage theft do not look
like Voris. They are often workers in low-wage industries, such as
“retail, restaurant and grocery stores; domestic work and homecare;
manufacturing, construction, and janitorial services; car washes, and
beauty and nail salons.”181 In fact, “[m]ost low-wage workers will
become victims of wage theft at some point in their careers.”182
Low-wage workers are also much more likely to feel the effects
of wage theft183 and much less likely to have the same resources as
Voris to recover their stolen wages.184 Because of the lengthy duration
of the wage claim and collections process, many workers suffer
serious economic harm as a result.185 Several victims interviewed for
the NELP Report reported going without food or medicine, or being
179. Id. at 300 (citing David Cooper & Teresa Kroeger, Employers Steal Billions from Workers’
Paychecks
Each
Year,
ECON.
POL’Y
INST.
10,
tbl.1
(May 10,
2017),
https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/125116.pdf) (other citation omitted).
180. See generally Lampert, 446 P.3d at 299–304 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (discussing the plight
of wage theft that many California workers experience).
181. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 4.
182. Hallett, supra note 4, at 99. “[W]omen, minorities, and those without legal authorization
to work in the United States are particularly vulnerable.” Id.; see, e.g., Stephen Lee, Policing Wage
Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 656 (2014) (“Like other day laborers,
Nemelio Martinez waits at a parking lot every morning seeking work. One day he is hired to
perform some landscaping work, to cut lawns for eight hours. At the end of the day, Martinez
approaches the employer to receive his eighty dollars in payment. The employer begs off and
promises to return the next day to hire him again. He will pay him then, he promises. Martinez
never sees him again. . . . This is wage theft.”).
183. See Cho et al., supra note 1, at 6.
184. See id.
185. Id.
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unable to pay their bills or rent.186 And in many instances, “workers
face[] retaliation from their employers after filing wage claims.”187
Employers have “lowered wages, fired [workers], or threatened to call
the police or immigration enforcement after learning that workers had
filed a wage claim or lawsuit.”188 Worse yet, even if workers are able
to obtain judgments against their employers, it is often another uphill
battle to collect on those judgments.189
Take van driver, Bin Wu, for example.190 In April 2012, Bin Wu
and five other employees filed claims with the California Labor
Commissioner, accusing their employer, American Airporter Shuttle
Inc. (“American Airporter”), of numerous wage violations.191 In 2016,
the Labor Commissioner ordered American Airporter and its CEO,
Phillip Achilles (“Achilles”), to pay $220,457 for those violations:
$212,407 for stolen wages to the employees, plus $8,050 in civil
penalties to the state.192 American Airporter and Achilles contested the
findings in San Francisco Superior Court but did nothing to advance

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 4 (“N.P., a janitorial worker who earned $8.00 per hour” was unable to collect
“$5,000 in unpaid wages . . . from her employer” despite winning a judgment. As a result, she
explained: “I fell behind on rent. I borrowed money. I was unable to give my kids everything they
needed. I had to leave my place and rent a smaller unit. I had to get another job. I felt upset and
powerless not to collect the wages I was owed.”).
190. See Wolfe, supra note 2.
191. Id. These violations included failure to pay California’s minimum wage, failure to pay
overtime wages, failure to provide meal breaks, and failure to provide itemized wage statements.
Findings and Order at 2, In re Am. Airporter Shuttle, Inc., Case No. 35-123104-T-565 (Cal. Dep’t
Indus. Rels. May 3, 2016) [hereinafter Findings and Order In re American Airporter]. According
to Wu’s testimony, American Airporter would encourage him to work through thirteen-hour days
with no meal break. Instead, the company asked him to eat his lunch while he waited for passengers.
See id. at 14. No one at the company told Wu he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal period before
the end of the fifth hour and a second meal period if he worked more than ten hours in a day. Id.
The airport shuttle company also classified Wu as an independent contractor—which exempted
them from wage regulations—even though Wu was not allowed to refuse assignments. Id. at 15.
Wu confirmed he signed an Independent Contractor agreement, but he did not understand what that
meant because the contract was in English and Wu only speaks Mandarin Chinese. Id.; Wolfe,
supra note 2.
192. Findings and Order In re American Airporter, supra note 191, at 44; see Letter from
Melvin Yee, Att’y, Cal. Lab. Comm’r, to Thomas Murphy, The Murphy Tr. et al. (Nov. 16,
2017), https://www.fairwarning.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Achilles-Demand-LetterFraudulent-Transfer.pdf [hereinafter Achilles Demand Letter].
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the plea for the next two years.193 During this period, Achilles “worked
secretly to hide his assets.”194
In 2017, “the Labor Commissioner discovered that Achilles was
trying to sell a building he owned in downtown San Francisco”—
allegedly worth over five million dollars—to evade payment of the
Labor Code violations.195 When the state tried to put a lien on the
property, Achilles transferred the building to a shell company for no
value and encumbered the property with significant debt.196 By doing
so, Achilles rendered himself insolvent and unable to pay the wages
he stole from Bin Wu and the other American Airporter employees.197
The Labor Commissioner sued Achilles in 2018 to undo the
fraudulent transfer.198 After the parties came to a settlement agreement
that Achilles soon breached, the court granted the Labor
Commissioner’s motion to enforce the settlement through a sheriff’s
sale, or public auction, of the property and entered judgment in April
2020.199 Achilles timely appealed. 200 As of December 2020—over
eight years after he first filed his claim against American Airporter—
Bin Wu has not recovered his stolen wages.201
According to the NELP Report, only 17 percent of California
workers who prevailed in their wage claims before the Labor
Commissioner and received judgments between 2008 and 2011 were
able to recover any payment at all.202 During that same period, the
193. Wolfe, supra note 2; see Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate at 1, Am. Airporter Shuttle,
Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., No. CPF-16-515101 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2016),
https://www.fairwarning.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Achilles-Writ-of-Mandate.pdf.
194. Wolfe, supra note 2.
195. Id.; see Achilles Demand Letter, supra note 192; Complaint at 7, Lab. Comm’r of
California v. Achilles, No. CGC-18-571050 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Achilles
Complaint].
196. Wolfe, supra note 2; Achilles Complaint, supra note 195, at 7–8.
197. Wolfe, supra note 2.
198. Id.; Achilles Complaint, supra note 195, at 1.
199. Achilles, No. CGC-18-571050, at 1–2; Order Granting Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement at 1, Achilles, No. CGC-18-571050.
200. See Notice of Appeal at 1, Achilles, CGC-18-571050.
201. Register of Actions, Labor Commissioner of the State of California v. Phillip Achilles et
al., SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL., CNTY. OF S.F., https://webapps.sftc.org/ci/CaseInfo.dll?CaseNum=C
GC18571050&SessionID=746079C205D0492F704CCACFBE8B162CAEF49A4B (last visited
Feb. 21, 2021). The last update in the “Register of Actions” on the County of San Francisco’s
Superior Court website is that on September 24, 2020, the appeal record was certified to the court
of appeal. Id.
202. Cho et al., supra note 1, at 13–14 (“Between 2008 and 2011, 18,683 workers prevailed in
their claims for unpaid wages before the [Labor Commissioner]. Only 3,084, or 17 percent—less
than 1 in 5 recovered any money at all.”).
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Labor Commissioner issued awards for “unpaid wages of more than
$282 million . . . , [but] workers were able to collect [only] $42 million
[from their employer]—roughly 15 percent.”203 Several workers
interviewed by NELP “expressed regret for [even] invest[ing] time in
the wage claim process.”204 One worker said, “although I won, I ended
up losing, because I spent a lot of time and money on my wage claim,
but walked away with nothing.”205
Wage theft causes severe economic distress on workers and their
families, but it also imposes significant costs on California’s
economy.206 When employers fail to pay their employees, the state
loses revenue in payroll taxes, and fewer dollars circulate to local
businesses.207 Consequently, wage theft hurts communities by
“stunting economic recovery, . . . limiting local sales tax collections,
and diminishing opportunities for local economic development.”208
While it certainly hurts individuals who have their wages stolen, wage
theft also hurts the entire community.209
The dissent’s priority was providing all workers, not just Voris,
with adequate remedies to combat wage theft—and rightfully so.210
Low-wage workers are often the ones impacted most by wage theft,
and the road to recovering their stolen wages is long and difficult.211
While there is no promise that allowing a conversion claim for the
nonpayment of wages would speed up the process or guarantee
recovery, it would equip workers with another remedy at their disposal
to combat wage theft.212 Further, it “may also help victims of wage
theft and society as a whole by better aligning employers’ incentives

203. Id. at 2.
204. Id. at 6.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 5.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See generally Voris v. Lampert, 446 P.3d 284, 299–304 (Cal. 2019) (Cuéllar, J.,
dissenting) (“This may also help victims of wage theft and society as a whole by better aligning
employers’ incentives with the full extent of the individual and social costs associated with the
conversion of unpaid wages.”).
211. See Cho et al., supra note 1, at 6.
212. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 304 (Cuellar, J., dissenting) (“The most reasonable inference is
that these legislative remedies ‘were meant to supplement, not supplant . . . , existing . . . remedies,
in order to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their . . . rights.’” (omissions in
original) (quoting Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 378 (Cal. 1990))).

(10) 54.3_KUANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

906

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/13/21 4:19 PM

[Vol. 54:881

with the full extent of the individual and social costs associated with
the conversion of unpaid wages.”213
2. Duplicating Existing Remedies
While the majority acknowledged the issue of wage theft and how
important it was for employees to receive prompt compensation,214 it
was more concerned with duplicating existing legislative remedies.215
Its reluctance to duplicate remedies is in part because a conversion
claim for the nonpayment of wages does not “fit[] well with the
traditional understanding of the tort.”216 Moreover, while the majority
believed conversion would not add anything new to the remedial
scheme, a conversion claim would still come with certain features
inherent to the tort—i.e., strict liability and punitive damages.217 The
majority was concerned those features would punish not only the
unscrupulous employers, but also employers who made a good-faith
mistake.218
Conversion is a strict liability tort and “does not require bad faith,
knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant
have intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her
rightful possession.”219 As a result, “conversion liability for unpaid
wages would not only reach those who act[ed] in bad faith, but also
those who made good-faith mistakes—for example, an employer who
fails to pay the correct amount in wages because of a glitch in the
payroll system or a clerical error.”220 The majority believed it was
important to distinguish between employers who acted in bad faith and
employers who made a good-faith mistake.221 However, it is difficult
to make that distinction when the conversion tort does not require a
finding of fault to impose liability.222

213. Id.
214. See id. at 299 (majority opinion) (“The full and prompt payment of wages is of
fundamental importance to the welfare of both workers and the State of California.”).
215. See id. at 295.
216. Id. at 298.
217. See id. at 295–96.
218. Id. at 296.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See id.; see also id. at 290 (“Notably absent from [the elements of conversion] is any
element of wrongful intent or motive; in California, conversion is a ‘strict liability tort.’”).
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Conversion also “authoriz[es] the recovery of consequential,
emotional distress, and, most importantly, punitive damages.”223
While Voris viewed those possible awards as advantages that would
“enhance deterrence of intentional wage nonpayment,” the majority
opined that conversion is an “awfully blunt tool” to deter intentional
misconduct because of how difficult it would be to limit conversion
liability to only certain bad actors.224 Even though punitive damages
may only be imposed if there is clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, the majority
contended that “it is not unusual for juries to find malice supporting
punitive damage awards in run-of-the-mill wage suits.”225 Further,
even if a defendant is not held liable for punitive damages, “they could
still be held to pay for the value of the converted property and interest,
plus the value of the plaintiff’s time and money expended in pursuit of
the unpaid wages.”226
The majority feared that given the nature of the conversion tort, a
conversion claim for unpaid wages “would reach well beyond those
individual corporate officers who withhold wages to punish disfavored
employees or who deliberately run down corporate coffers to evade
wage judgments” and punish employers acting in good faith.227
Understandably so—the term “wage theft” itself already comes with a
negative connotation.228 Critics believe that the term unfairly vilifies
business owners because “wage and hours laws are a complicated
morass that are difficult for even the savviest employer to understand,
and that technical violations of the law can lead to harsh penalties.”229
And of course, not every instance of wage theft is intentional or
unscrupulous.230 Indeed, there is a difference between a company
owner who misappropriated funds or deliberately evaded an adverse
judgment and a company owner who was also wiped out when the
company went under—and perhaps that distinction should be

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 295.
Id. at 295–96.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id. at 298–99.
Hallett, supra note 4, at 99.
Id.
Id.
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recognized.231 However, the traditional application of the conversion
tort would not recognize such a distinction.232
Because a conversion claim for unpaid wages would come with
undesirable features inherent to the conversion tort, like strict liability
and punitive damages, the majority found “no sufficient justification
for layering tort liability on top of the extensive existing remedies.”233
C. Not All Victims Can Recover Their Stolen Wages Under the
Existing Remedial Scheme
Unlike the dissent, which considered victims of wage theft
collectively, the majority took an arguably narrower approach and
focused only on the present case. The majority is correct that the
existing provisions in the Labor Code provides sufficient remedies for
Voris, especially after the enactment of Senate Bill 588.234 However,
the majority opinion overlooked situations beyond this case where the
ability to maintain a conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages is
crucial for an employee to recover their stolen wages.235
1. Voris Can Recover Without Maintaining a Conversion Claim for
His Unpaid Wages
While the remedies in existence were inadequate when Voris first
filed suit, that was no longer true by the time his case reached the
California Supreme Court.236 At the time of the court’s ruling,
allowing a conversion claim for unpaid wages would largely duplicate
existing remedies for Voris; his conversion claim against Lampert, an
individual who is “responsible for their companies’ evasion of their
established wage obligations,” would likely provide no better
restitution than a contract claim or the Labor Code.237

231. See infra Section IV.D.
232. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 295–96.
233. Id.
234. See infra Section IV.C.1; S.B. 588, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); Lampert, 446 P.3d
at 297–98.
235. See infra Section IV.C.2.
236. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 297 (“[A]fter Voris filed this suit, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 588 (Senate Bill 588) to address the precise problem Voris alleges.”); id. at 302 (Cuéllar,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he nonconversion remedies in existence at the time Voris filed suit were
inadequate.”).
237. See id. at 296; Cal. S.B. 588.
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As mentioned, Senate Bill 588 added section 588.1 to the Labor
Code in 2015.238 Under Labor Code section 558.1,
[a]ny employer or other person acting on behalf of an
employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any
provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of
work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, or
violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7,
1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may be held liable as the employer
for such violation.239
The code clarifies that another “‘person acting on behalf of an
employer’ is limited to a natural person who is an owner, director,
officer, or managing agent of the employer.”240 Individual officers are
also subject to civil and criminal penalties for failing to observe Senate
Bill 588’s enforcement laws.241
If Senate Bill 588 were in effect at the time of his initial lawsuit,
Voris could have gone after Lampert personally to satisfy the
judgments against the startups under Labor Code section 558.1.242 He
would not have needed to allege Lampert converted his unpaid wages
because even without alter ego liability, Voris could hold Lampert
liable in place of PropPoint, Liquiddium, and Sportfolio for the wage
violations.243 Although Senate Bill 588 does not apply retroactively,
its enforcement-related provisions do apply to Voris’s existing
judgments against the startups.244

238. Cal. S.B. 588; CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg.
Sess.); see supra Section III.A.3.
239. CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1(a).
240. Id. § 558.1(b).
241. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 298; Cal. S.B. 588; CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1. Senate Bill 588 also
added Labor Code section 238, which requires companies to post a bond with the state to satisfy
unpaid judgments or halt all business in California; if an employer were continue doing business
without posting required bond, any “person acting on behalf of [the] employer” is subject to a civil
penalty of $2,500. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 298 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 238(f)). Further, if an
“‘owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the employer’ fails to observe a stop order issued
by the [Labor] Commissioner,” the individual is guilty of a misdemeanor and can face up to 60
days in jail and a fine of up to $10,000. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 298 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 238.1(b)).
242. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1.
243. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296–97.
244. See id. at 298 n.18.
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2. However, Victims of Wage Theft Caused by Third-Party Bad
Actors Cannot Recover Under the Existing Remedial Scheme
The Labor Code enables Voris to go after Lampert personally for
his unpaid wages without maintaining a conversion claim, but not all
victims of wage theft can recover under the existing remedial scheme.
In an amicus curiae brief filed in support of Voris, a group of nonprofit legal services and public policy organizations dedicated to
representing victims of wage theft245 noted that workers have “only a
patchwork of remedies” available to recover their stolen wages, and
“[r]emedies are particularly scarce and ineffective when actions by
third parties interfere with workers’ ability to collect unpaid
wages.”246 Although Labor Code section 558.1 holds some individuals
liable, it is “only for underlying wage and hour violations” and “only
by [those] acting on behalf of the employer.”247 The available
remedies do not consider “separate acts by persons outside the
employer-debtor context” that could “deprive employers of funds to
pay wages, or otherwise render collection impossible.”248
Take, for example, an employee who has her wages improperly
garnished by a third-party payroll processor.249 The employee cannot
go after her employer because her employer is not the one withholding
her wages. However, the employee would also be unable to go after
the third-party payroll processor under Labor Code section 558.1
because it is not an “other person acting on behalf of an employer.”250
The payroll processor is not “a natural person who is an owner,
245. Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff and Appellant at 1, Lampert, 446
P.3d 284 (No. S241812) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Voris].
246. Id. at 10.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., McGown v. Silverman & Borenstein, PLLC, No. 13-cv-748-RGA/MPT, 2014
WL 545903, at *4 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014) (upholding conversion claim against third-party collection
agency for improperly garnishing an employee’s wages but dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction).
250. Michaela Goldstein & Michael Campbell, Managers Beware: Can You Be Held
Personally Liable for Wage and Hour Violations?, LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2018/12/articles/california-employmentlegislation/managers-personally-liable-wage-hour-violations/ (discussing the application of the
“other person” language of section 558.1 to managing agents of the employer (not third parties));
CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) (“Any employer
or other person acting on behalf of an employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any
provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial
Welfare Commission, or violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7, 1193.6, 1194,
or 2802, may be held liable as the employer for such violation.”).
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director, officer, or managing agent of the employer.”251 It is simply a
third-party entity, but it still plays a major role in depriving the
employee of her earned wages.252
The majority opinion briefly acknowledged such situations in a
footnote: “Many of the jurisdictions that have recognized conversion
claims involving wages have done so in meaningfully different
contexts, for instance where an employee’s wages were garnished or
assigned to a third party.”253 Although the majority recognized that
situations involving third-parties were “different” than the present
case, it did not suggest that a conversion claim should remain available
to address “different contexts.”254 Rather, the majority opinion may
undermine the availability of conversion in those instances because it
broadly holds that in California, an individual cannot maintain a
conversion claim based on the nonpayment of wages.255 As a result,
workers do not have a remedy to recover their stolen wages in
situations where the nonpayment is caused by persons outside the
employer-debtor context because those actors “remain outside the
purview of the remedial scheme.”256
D. A Conversion Claim for Unpaid Wages Should Be Available in
Limited Circumstances When Two Elements Are Met
To help all victims of wage theft, not just Voris, a conversion
claim for unpaid wages should not be categorically barred. Instead, it
should be available to workers in limited circumstances to help
recover their stolen wages. Voris made his own attempt to narrow the
liability of a conversion claim for unpaid wages, arguing for a “‘case
by case consideration’ of factors that inform th[e] court’s recognition
of tort duties, such as the foreseeability of harm and the nexus between
the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.”257 However, the
majority rejected those factors because Voris “fail[ed] to explain how
the[] factors would impose any meaningful limits in the context of a
claim for wage nonpayment, which invariably and directly injures
251. CAL. LAB. CODE § 558.1(b) (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘other person acting
on behalf of an employer’ is limited to a natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or
managing agent of the employer.”).
252. See McGown, 2014 WL 545903, at *1.
253. Voris v. Lampert, 446 P.3d 284, 289 n.6 (Cal. 2019).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 286.
256. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Voris, supra note 245, at 10.
257. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296 (citing J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 65–66 (Cal. 1979)).
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employees.”258 The majority believed “it would be difficult if not
impossible to formulate a rule that would assure that only ‘deserving’
cases give rise to tort relief.”259 Nevertheless, this Section attempts to
do so anyway.
Instead of looking at the foreseeability of harm or nexus between
the conduct and the injury, a conversion claim for unpaid wages
should be limited to situations where (1) the court can ascertain the
specific sum of money that is owed; and (2) the employee can show
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant (the employer,
employer’s officers, or a third party) acted with malice, oppression, or
fraud in withholding the employee’s wages. Unlike the factors Voris
suggested, the two elements proposed here address the majority’s
concerns about the conversion tort head on; those concerns are what
influenced the majority to hold that conversion is not the appropriate
fit to address wage nonpayment.260
1. An Ascertainable, Specific Sum of Money
The first element—situations where the court can ascertain the
specific sum of money that is owed—is similar to the existing rule that
“money cannot be the subject of an action for conversion unless a
specific sum capable of identification is involved.”261 In fact, it is the
dissent’s interpretation of what that rule means: “That the unpaid
wages may be commingled with the employer’s general funds does
not disqualify them as property that may be converted, so long as the
sum owed is specific and definite.”262 As long as the court can
ascertain the specific sum of money that is owed, it should not matter
if the unpaid wages are still in the employer’s possession or
commingled with the employer’s funds; the wages are “a specific sum
capable of identification.”263
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence That the Defendant Acted with
Malice, Oppression, or Fraud in Withholding the Employee’s Wages
The second element—situations where the employee can show by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice,
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. (citing In re Trombley, 193 P.2d 734, 740 (Cal. 1948)).
Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 399 (Cal. 1988)).
See supra Section IV.B.2.
Lampert, 446 P.3d at 291 (quoting Haigler v. Donnelly, 117 P.2d 331, 335 (Cal. 1941)).
Id. at 301 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
See id. at 291 (majority opinion) (quoting Haigler, 117 P.2d at 335).
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oppression, or fraud in withholding their wages—addresses the
majority’s concerns that as a strict liability tort, a conversion claim for
unpaid wages could potentially reach defendants acting in good faith
and allow for punitive damages.264 By requiring the employee to show
that the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud in
withholding the wages, this element effectively eliminates the strict
liability aspect of the tort.265 The heightened “clear and convincing
evidence” standard266 would further minimize the chances that
conversion liability would reach employers, officers, or third parties
“who make good-faith mistakes” because the standard “requires a high
probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial
doubt.”267
Moreover, this additional hurdle ensures that only bad actors are
faced with punitive damages. Punitive damages also require a showing
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with
oppression, fraud, or malice.268 By requiring the same showing to even
maintain an action for the conversion of unpaid wages and recover
compensatory damages, defendants who acted in good faith would not
be liable for punitive damages because they would not be liable under
conversion at all. The majority worried that it was not uncommon for
juries to award punitive damages, even in “run-of-the-mill wage
suits,” but adopting this second element would mean there will no
longer be “run-of-the-mill” suits for the conversion of unpaid
wages.269 Even if the same concern with the jury remains, in
California, jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.270
264. See supra Section IV.B.2.
265. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296 (“[C]onversion is a strict liability tort . . . [that] does not
require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have
intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession.”).
266. See Jerald M. Montoya, Note, Requiring Clear and Convincing Proof in Tort Claims
Involving Recently Recovered Repressed Memories, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 173, 198 (1995) (“Although
the burden of proof in most cases is a preponderance of the evidence, many jurisdictions require a
party to prove the elements of certain civil claims with clear and convincing proof.”).
267. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296; In re John M., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281, 284 (Ct. App. 2006)
(quoting In re Luke M., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907, 917 (Ct. App. 2003)).
268. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 290 (“Punitive damages are recoverable upon a showing of malice,
fraud, or oppression.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (Deering 2021) (“In an action for the breach of
an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual
damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”).
269. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 295–96.
270. People v. Sanchez, 29 P.3d 209, 220–21 (Cal. 2001) (citing People v. Scott, 246 Cal. Rptr.
406, 408 (Ct. App. 1988)).

(10) 54.3_KUANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

914

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

6/13/21 4:19 PM

[Vol. 54:881

The majority was also concerned that even if the defendants are
not held liable for punitive damages, they could still be forced to pay
for the converted wages, interest, and the value of the plaintiff’s time
and money in pursuing the wages.271 That would no longer be an issue
if the employee can show by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud in withholding their
wages. If the defendant did act unscrupulously, he should be liable for
interest and the value of the plaintiff’s time and money, on top of the
stolen wages. In fact, he should also be liable for punitive damages.272
The second element distinguishes between defendants acting in good
faith and those who deliberately commit wage theft—what the
majority worried a conversion claim based on the nonpayment of
wages would be unable to do.273
Finally, allowing a conversion claim for unpaid wages would not
“collapse the well-established distinction between a contractual
obligation to pay and the tortious conversion of monetary interests.”274
There is already so much overlap between contract and tort law,275
and, as the dissent noted, other jurisdictions have recognized wage
conversion claims without any adverse effects.276 Therefore, a
conversion claim for unpaid wages should not be categorically barred,
especially when it does not “duplicate [existing] remedies” for victims
of wage theft that cannot recover under those existing remedies.277
Instead, conversion should be available, with limitations, to
supplement the legislative scheme.278

271. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 296.
272. See id. at 290 (“Punitive damages are recoverable upon a showing of malice, fraud, or
oppression.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”).
273. See supra Section IV.B.2.
274. See Lampert, 446 P.3d at 292.
275. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 100, at 87–94 (discussing how when a party to a contract
is wronged, courts are now much less inclined to follow traditional contract law, and more likely
to just apply tort principles to address the wrongdoing); id. at 87 (“[T]he theory of tort into which
contract is being reabsorbed is itself a much more expansive theory of liability than was the theory
of tort from which contract was artificially separated a hundred years ago.”).
276. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 302 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 295 (majority opinion); see supra Section IV.C.2.
278. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 304 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
Voris v. Lampert held that an individual cannot maintain a
conversion claim for the nonpayment of wages.279 Instead of the sound
application of precedent, both the majority and the dissent were
heavily influenced by different public policy concerns.280 The
dissenting opinion addressed the issue of wage theft and wanted to
give victims a variety of options to recover their stolen wages by
allowing conversion to supplement existing legislative remedies.281
The majority opinion, however, was concerned that a conversion
claim would add nothing to existing remedies, except for undesirable
features inherent to the conversion tort.282 While the majority is
correct that Voris would be able to reach Lampert without maintaining
a conversion claim, it overlooked instances of wage theft where the
bad actor is not covered under the existing remedial scheme.283 To
address the majority’s concerns about the conversion tort, and to
protect all victims of wage theft, a conversion claim for unpaid wages
should be available to employees in situations where (1) the court can
ascertain the specific sum of money that is owed; and (2) the employee
can show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted
with malice, oppression, or fraud in withholding the employee’s
wages.284
Alternatively, the Legislature should expand on the Labor Code
and address the issue of third-party actors outside the employer-debtor
context who cannot be held liable under the existing remedial scheme.
After all, the California Supreme Court recognizes and upholds “the
Legislature’s authority to adopt new solutions to combat [wage theft],”
and “various Labor Code provisions illustrate [how] the Legislature
can craft rights and remedies that target those . . . who withhold wages
willfully and repeatedly, and who strategically evade wage
judgments.”285 But, regardless of whether the courts or the Legislature
279. Id. at 286 (majority opinion).
280. See supra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
281. See supra Section IV.B.1.
282. See supra Section IV.B.2.
283. See supra Section IV.C.
284. See supra Section IV.D.
285. Voris v. Lampert, 446 P.3d 284, 297, 299 (Cal. 2019). That has also proven true in other
areas of labor and employment law, such as Assembly Bill 5, which expanded on landmark case
Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018) (holding workers are
presumptively employees and the burden is on the employer to establish that a worker is an
independent contractor who is not subject to California’s wage protections); Assemb. B. 5, 2019–
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undertake the duty, all victims of wage theft should be able to recover
their stolen wages in a timely manner. After all, “[t]he full and prompt
payment of wages is of fundamental importance to the welfare of both
workers and the State of California.”286

2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to codify the
decision in the Dynamex case and clarify its application.” (emphasis added)); see also Cal. Sec’y
of State, Proposition 22, OFF. VOTER INFO. GUIDE FOR 2020 GEN. ELECTION, https://voterguide.
sos.ca.gov/propositions/22/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (an exemption from A.B. 5 for
app-based drivers that passed in California in November 2020).
286. Lampert, 446 P.3d at 297, 299.

